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1 See Emmons (1996) for an
overview of the retail payments
system in the United States.
See Humphrey, Pulley, and
Vesala (1996) for a compari-
son of G-10 countries’ retail
payments systems or Bank for
International Settlements
(1993b) for details on both
retail and wholesale compo-
nents of payments systems in
the G-10 countries.





3 “Secured” net settlement sys-
tems (discussed later in this
article) are those that can with-
stand the failure of the member
ﬁnancial institution with the
largest amount due to other
members of the system.










ayments systems can be divided 
conceptually into two components:
retail and wholesale.  The retail pay-
ments system, used primarily by non-
banks for making and receiving payments,
involves relatively small transfers of mone-
tary value.  In contrast, the wholesale sys-
tem, which banks use to make payments
to each other, involves relatively large
transfers.1
The Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) in Basle, Switzerland (a consultative
forum for major central banks) has recently
published a series of reports covering var-
ious aspects of the wholesale payments
system,2 the purposes of which are, ﬁrst,
to inform central bankers and payments-
system participants about current practices
in wholesale payments systems, and
second, to provide a central-bank perspec-
tive on how various changes to these
practices could enhance the safety and 
efﬁciency of wholesale payments systems.
This article summarizes the reforms to 
G-10 wholesale payments systems
documented in and spurred by this 
series of BIS reports.
One general approach has been to
strengthen (or “secure”) existing payments
system arrangements based on net settle-
ment.3 Net settlement systems accumulate
a record of ﬁnancial obligations among
participants over a prespeciﬁed period of
time, such as a business day, at the end of
which the net amount of funds, securities,
or other ﬁnancial obligations owed by or
to each participant is transferred. The 
primary shortcoming of traditional “unse-
cured” net settlement systems is that not
only do they expose their own members 
to the risk of default by other members,
they also expose ﬁnancial institutions and
other creditors outside the netting system.
The danger is that liquidity or solvency
problems will thus be transmitted quickly
and unpredictably throughout the global
ﬁnancial system.
“Secured” net settlement systems, on
the other hand, are designed so that any
disruptions caused by a single member
(even if this happens to be the institution
with the largest net obligations to other
members) can be absorbed by the system
and its members with no risk of further
propagation.  To achieve this goal, such
systems require that members undertake
extensive and perhaps costly risk-manage-
ment measures.  These measures typically
include real-time monitoring of counter-
parties within the system, net debit caps,
collateralization, and additional open-
ended ﬁnancial guarantees in case all 
other safeguards prove inadequate.
Another approach to strengthening
wholesale payments systems involves
greater private-sector use of gross settlement.
Gross settlement systems include real-time
gross settlement payments systems
(RTGS), delivery-versus-payment (DVP)
systems, and payment-versus-payment
(PVP) systems.  Recently, many central
banks have created new RTGS systems or
improved their existing ones to strengthen
their wholesale payments systems.  In con-
trast to unsecured net settlement systems,
gross settlement systems can eliminate 
virtually all repercussions to other private-
sector members when one institution
encounters difﬁculty.  There is a cost, how-
ever.  Depending on its structure, a gross
settlement system may impose signiﬁcant
liquidity demands on participants, or it
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substantial supervisory and risk-
management costs in the process of
alleviating liquidity burdens.
Most G-10 central bankers believe
that, despite their costs, gross settlement
systems will be important components of
wholesale payments systems in the future.
Why, then, have private-sector ﬁnancial
institutions very often chosen to upgrade
and secure existing net settlement systems
instead of moving more rapidly to gross
settlement systems?  Could (and should)
central banks do more to facilitate a more
widespread and rapid transition to gross
settlement systems? 
This article does not provide deﬁnitive
answers to these questions.  Instead, I offer
an overview of recent developments in
large-value gross and net settlement systems
in the G-10 countries.  In the ﬁrst section,
I discuss gross settlement systems, including
RTGS systems, for large-value funds trans-
fers; DVP systems, for securities;  and PVP
systems, for foreign-exchange settlement.
The second section discusses net
settlement systems and explores several
related issues, including the risk that net-
ting agreements may not be legally binding
in all jurisdictions and the possibility that
liquidity or solvency problems could spill
over from one ﬁnancial institution to another
and, in turn, to the ﬁnancial system as a
whole, creating a situation termed systemic
risk.  The third section concludes with a
few tentative hypotheses regarding the rel-
atively slow movement to date of wholesale
payments and settlement activity to gross
settlement systems.
GROSS SETTLEMENT  
SYSTEMS
“Federal Reserve Updates Payments-
System Risk Policy, Implements Pricing on
Fedwire.”
“European Central Banks Reach Outline
Agreement on TARGET.”
“Bank of Japan to Convert BOJ-Net to
Real-Time Gross Settlement Exclusively.”4
The common theme in these ﬁctional
but representative headlines is a desire on
the part of G-10 central banks to inﬂuence
private-sector behavior in wholesale
(large-value) payments systems.  In partic-
ular, central banks have encouraged the
use of real-time gross settlement payments
systems and trade-by-trade securities and
foreign-exchange settlement systems.  This
situation has occurred because there is 
virtual agreement among major central
banks that gross settlement systems make
wholesale payments systems more immune
to widespread ﬁnancial disruption, a 
key determinant of economic stability 
and efﬁciency.
Key Design Issues in Real-Time
Gross Settlement Systems
Real-time gross settlement systems 
are large-value funds transfer services that
operate continuously during the business
day to provide irrevocable settlement of pay-
ments obligations in central-bank money.
Irrevocable funds transfers on RTGS systems
occur when a central bank debits the reserve
account of the payor and credits the account
of the payee.  This transfer of value from
payor to payee is simultaneous and ﬁnal
(i.e., not subject to reversal for any reason).
If the funds transfer occurs (at least in prin-
ciple) at the time the instructions of the
payor are transmitted to the central bank,
then it is said to occur continuously, or in
“real time.”
Central banks provide RTGS systems
to commercial banks and other selected
institutions such as government agencies
and, in some countries, clearing houses for
securities and derivatives exchanges (Bank
for International Settlements, 1997a, 
pp. 33-7; Bank for International Settlements,
1997b, p. 14).  Funds transfers over RTGS
systems may be for millions of dollars or
the local-currency equivalent, although
these systems also handle smaller
payments.
The design and operation of RTGS 
systems differ considerably from one
country to another.  Two important dimen-
sions along which currently operating or
4 Fedwire (the Federal Reserve’s
Fedwire Funds Transfer
Service), TARGET (the Trans-
European Automated Real-time
Gross Settlement Express
Transfer System), and BOJ-Net
(the Bank of Japan’s large-
value funds transfer service)
are all real-time gross settle-
ment (RTGS) systems.
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cies toward the granting of central bank
intraday credit and (2) the existence and
management of queues (see Table 1).
Intraday credit is valuable in an RTGS
system because it can reduce payment
blockages that may arise as one bank’s out-
going payment awaits an incoming payment
from another bank, which may, in turn, be
waiting on a payment from a third bank.
Payments may become blocked in RTGS
systems because of the “cover principle” 
in gross settlement systems: An outgoing
payment order is executed if and only if
the sending bank currently has sufﬁcient
reserves, or cover, in its reserve account at
the central bank.
The worst case of uncoordinated 
payment demands is gridlock, in which 
no bank can make a payment through an
RTGS system because all reserve balances
are held by banks due to receive payments
from others.  Although unlimited central
bank intraday credit would eliminate grid-
lock, it is not offered in any RTGS systems
because such a policy would create moral
hazard, in that banks might tend to manage
their intraday liquidity less intensively.
Such a situation could give rise to an acute
liquidity crisis, into which central banks
would need to intervene in their role as
lender of last resort.  Ample availability of
central bank intraday credit could also
hamper the emergence of intraday money
markets, which are, in principle, a necessary
component of a complete and efﬁcient set
of ﬁnancial markets.
Despite the fact that all RTGS systems
are capable of operating continuously,
some payment orders in some RTGS
systems are not carried out immediately.
For example, when a sending bank has
insufﬁcient funds in its reserve account
and central bank intraday credit is not
available, either temporarily for that bank
or as a matter of system design, a payment
order will not be executed.  A pending
payment order is subject to two different
responses by central banks.  
The payment order may be rejected
outright, in which case the sender may
enter it into an “internal queue” that assigns
priority to outgoing payments.  Selected
payment orders are then resubmitted to
the RTGS system when sufﬁcient covering
funds in the bank’s reserve account become
available, either from payments received or
via borrowing from another bank.
Alternatively, a payment order that
cannot be executed because of insufﬁcient
reserve funds may enter a “centralized
queue” maintained by the central bank.
That is, rather than returning the payment
order unexecuted to the sending institution,
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Intraday Credit Policies and Centrally Located Queues  
in G-10 RTGS Systems
Countries Whose RTGS Centrally No Centrally 
Systems Provide:  Located Queue  Located Queue
Central bank intraday credit  Belgium  United Kingdom





No central bank intraday credit  Switzerland  Japan
No RTGS system:  Canada.
SOURCE:  Bank for International Settlements (1997a, Table 3, p.  13).
Table 1the central bank may retain all payment
orders that require incoming cover in a
centrally located computer ﬁle.  When
adequate reserves become available to 
execute any of the queued requests, the
central bank then reenters the payment
order into the system. 
A centrally located and managed queue
can facilitate an orderly ﬂow of payments
because the system operator can identify
payment requests that will offset each other
to some extent.  That is, one payment pro-
vides cover for the next, which provides
cover for the next, and so forth.  This type
of oversight and queue management is
termed “optimization” (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 1997a, pp. 24-7).
The existence of a centralized queue
and optimization routines may discourage
intensive management of intraday liquidity
by banks.  These factors may also encourage
banks to anticipate payments (i.e., credit
the accounts of depositors to whom
queued payments are directed before ﬁnal
settlement actually occurs).  Unfortunately,
the practice of systematically anticipating
payments that are being held in queues
tends to increase systemic interde-
pendence and settlement risk—precisely
the problems  that RTGS systems are
designed to eliminate.
Overview of RTGS Systems 
in G-10 Countries
Table 2 lists the RTGS systems
currently in operation or in preparation in
the G-10 countries.  The Federal Reserve’s
Fedwire funds-transfer service is the oldest
RTGS system in the world.  Since 1984,
RTGS systems have been introduced by all
other members of the G-10 group of coun-
tries except Canada.  Other European
Union countries (i.e., those not in the 
G-10) that hope to participate in the initial
launch of the European single currency in
1999, including Greece, Spain, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, and
Finland, are also developing RTGS systems
(European Monetary Institute, 1996).
Other countries that have recently intro-
duced RTGS systems or plan to do so
include the Czech Republic, Hong Kong,
Korea, Thailand, Australia, China, New
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Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) Systems in G-10 Countries
Country  Name of RTGS System  Year of Implementation
Belgium  ELLIPS  1996
Canada  —  —
France  TBF  1997
Germany  EIL-ZV  1988
Italy  BI-REL*  1997
Japan  BOJ-NET  1988
Netherlands  TOP*  1997
Sweden  RIX  1986
Switzerland  SIC  1987
United Kingdom  CHAPS  1984
Euro version of CHAPS  1999
United States  Fedwire  1918
*BI-REL and TOP replace previously existing RTGS systems BISS (implemented in 1989) and FA (implemented in 1985), respectively
(Bank for International Settlements, 1993b, pp. 218-19, 302-5).
SOURCE:  Bank for International Settlements  (1997a), Annex 1.
Table 2Zealand, and Saudi Arabia (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 1997a, p. 1).
The Federal Reserve System’s Fedwire
Funds Transfer Service (commonly known
as “Fedwire”) began operations in 1918
and was converted to a fully computerized,
high-speed electronic telecommunications
and processing network in 1970 (Bank for
International Settlements, 1997a, p. 12).
In addition to upgrading Fedwire technical
and communications capabilities, the Fed-
eral Reserve has also implemented a series
of measures to improve Fedwire risk man-
agement in recent years (Richards, 1995;
Hancock and Wilcox, 1996).  One focus 
of these efforts has been to reduce banks’
daylight overdrafts (short-term credit
extensions by the central bank) on Fedwire
(see shaded insert: “Federal Reserve
Attempts to Limit Daylight Overdrafts 
on Fedwire”). 
RTGS systems in European G-10
countries differ among themselves but
generally fall into two categories according
to whether or not the country expects to
participate in the initial phase of European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
beginning in 1999.  Those countries that
plan to participate (Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, and the Netherlands) have
conformed their RTGS systems to a
common set of standards to facilitate their
interlinking in the TARGET system.  In
particular, fairly liberal policies toward
central bank intraday credit and centralized
queuing facilities are envisioned for partic-
ipating RTGS systems.  Both of these
features enhance the liquidity of RTGS sys-
tems.  In contrast to Fedwire, the EMU
systems will not assess charges for daylight
overdrafts, although such borrowings must
be fully collateralized in order to protect
the ﬂedgling European System of Central
Banks against credit risk posed by individual
banks (Bank for International Settlements,
1997a, pp. 12-3).  European G-10 members
that do not plan to participate in EMU at
the outset include the U.K. and Switzerland
(not a member of the European Union).
Liquidity-enhancing measures in these
countries’ RTGS systems (particularly in
Switzerland) are not as liberal as those of the
other European countries mentioned above,
as the discussion below will make clear.
The Bank of Japan is prepared to go
further than any other G-10 central bank
in forcing the pace of change toward RTGS
systems.  Currently, banks may submit pay-
ments to BOJ-Net to be settled at 9:00 a.m.,
1:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m., or 5:00 p.m. on a net
basis; or payment orders may be submitted
for immediate execution via the RTGS mode
of BOJ-Net.  The BOJ announced at the end
of 1996 that it will phase out the net settle-
ment capability of BOJ-Net by the year
2000 (Matsushita, 1997).  Thereafter, real-
time gross settlement will be the only mode
of settlement available via BOJ accounts.
This is a signiﬁcant policy decision, because
designated-time net settlements accounted
for 98.8 percent of volume and 99.9 percent
of value on BOJ-Net in 1995, while RTGS
accounted for the remainder (Bank for
International Settlements, 1997a, Annex 1).
In sum, there appears to be no 
international consensus regarding the
optimal design of an RTGS system.  This
conclusion is not surprising when one
takes into account signiﬁcant cross-country
differences in central-bank preferences,
locally prevailing cash-management tech-
nologies, availability of collateral, and
securities market liquidity (Furﬁne and
Stehm, 1996).  All existing systems appear
to be a compromise between objectives
that sometimes conﬂict among banks and
institutional constraints that may be evalu-
ated differently by different central banks.
The Role of Intraday Credit 
in RTGS Systems
Some RTGS systems allow partic-
ipating banks to send payments with
ﬁnality for amounts greater than their
reserve balances immediately prior to the
time of the request. In carrying out such a
payment request, the central bank extends
a short-term loan to fund the reserve
account of the sending bank.  Since all
central banks that grant such credit exten-
sions require repayment by the end of the
business day, these loans are termed
daylight overdrafts.5
5 All G-10 central banks provide
overnight lending facilities,
some of which can be accessed
during the business day (Bank
for International Settlements,
1997a, Annex 1, Part II).
Without exception, banks ﬁnd
them relatively unattractive
sources of intraday funds to
meet payments obligations.  
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light overdraft privileges on RTGS systems
(Bank for International Settlements,
1997a, pp. 14-21 and Annex 1, Part II).
Among G-10 RTGS systems, daylight over-
drafts on Fedwire within a bank’s net debit
cap are unusual in that they do not gener-
ally require speciﬁc collateral backing.6
This feature is advantageous to banks,
which typically do not need to hold or
6 Each bank’s net debit cap is set
as a multiple of its regulatory
capital.  Branches or agencies
of foreign banks, domestic
ﬁnancial institutions that have
been identiﬁed by the Federal
Reserve as troubled, and non-
bank ﬁnancial institutions that
provide overdraft funding of
securities activities for afﬁliates
must provide collateral for 
overdrafts. Collateral is also
required for frequent and mate-
rial overdrafters. In total, more
than 50 percent of all intraday
credit extended by the Fed is
collateralized.
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FEDERAL RESERVE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT DAYLIGHT
OVERDRAFTS ON FEDWIRE
For more than 10 years, the Federal Reserve has undertaken a campaign to induce
banks to control the amount of their daylight overdrafts on Fedwire.  While Fed policy-
makers have long believed that relatively liberal provision of central bank intraday
credit on Fedwire was appropriate (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1988, p. 50), they also felt that some form of market discipline or regulatory restraint
on daylight overdrafts could improve the allocative efﬁciency of such credit without
sacriﬁcing its overall beneﬁts in terms of enhancing the system’s liquidity.  The impetus
for Federal Reserve action to limit Fedwire daylight overdrafts stemmed from three
considerations (Richards, 1995, pp. 1066-67):
First, large daylight overdrafts create the potential for large demands for overnight
borrowing, thereby complicating the conduct of monetary policy.  Since daylight over-
drafts are unsecured, but overnight discount-window loans must be secured, a large
overhang of daylight overdrafts that cannot be repaid by day’s end could create disor-
derly conditions in the Federal funds and securities markets as reserves and collateral
are sought to eliminate or secure Federal Reserve lending.  Alternatively, such an over-
hang could force the Fed to allow some uncollateralized overnight overdrafts, thus vio-
lating its own risk-management policies.
Second, the Fed became increasingly aware in the 1980s of the substantial credit
risk associated with unsecured daylight overdrafts.  The Fed guarantees all payments
made on Fedwire, so unlimited, unpriced, unsecured overdrafts allowed sending banks
to appropriate the Federal Reserve’s unsurpassed credit rating at no cost to themselves.
Finally, the Fed began to recognize more clearly that substantial daylight overdraft-
ing on private large-value transfer systems put the payments system as a whole at risk.
In order to control the risk in parts of the wholesale payments system over which the
Fed had only indirect inﬂuence—such as CHIPS
†—it was necessary to accumulate
experience and demonstrate progress in managing risk where the Fed did maintain con-
trol, namely, on Fedwire.  Controlling daylight overdrafts on Fedwire was a step toward
implementing sound intraday credit policies throughout the wholesale payments system.
The Federal Reserve imposed net debit caps on daylight overdrafts in March 1986
and began charging explicit fees for daylight overdrafts in accounts at Federal Reserve
Banks in April 1994 (Hancock and Wilcox, 1996, pp. 873-76).  The Fed also uses real-
time monitoring for “problem” institutions and requires these and selected other
Fedwire participants to post collateral for daylight overdrafts.  Net debit caps were
tightened and adjusted several times subsequent to their introduction, while overdraft
fees were increased in April 1995.  Empirical evidence indicates that these measures—
especially overdraft fees—have been effective in curtailing certain banks’ use of day-
light overdrafts on Fedwire (Hancock and Wilcox, 1996, pp. 906-7).
† CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) is a net settlement system operated by the New York Clearing House Association.  
See section on net settlement systems for details.manage signiﬁcant amounts of reserves or
collateral for payments purposes.  Another
unusual aspect of daylight overdrafts on
Fedwire is explicit volume-based pricing.
The Federal Reserve charges an annualized
rate of 15 basis points on the daily average
overdraft in excess of the bank’s deductible
amount, which is 10 percent of its regula-
tory capital.  Only about 90 ﬁnancial
institutions typically incurred overdraft
fees of more than $100 in any two-week
period in 1995 (Richards, 1995, p. 1072),
so Fedwire overdraft fees do not constitute
a large explicit cost for intraday credit.7
Given the existence of some amount of
unpriced, uncollateralized daylight credit
(up to the amount of a bank’s net debit cap)
and low explicit costs for overdrafts in excess
of an institution’s deductible, the Federal
Reserve’s intraday credit policy could be
termed relatively liberal, overall. 
Another model for central-bank exten-
sions of intraday credit requires a borrowing
bank to fully collateralize the overdraft.8
This approach is typical of existing or
planned European RTGS systems that
permit daylight overdrafts.  Quantitative
limits on overdrafts apply in Belgium and
Italy but not in Germany, the Netherlands,
or Sweden (Bank for International
Settlements, 1997a, Annex 1, Part II).
Intraday credit in the U.K. and France
is available not through daylight overdrafts
per se but rather through intraday sale and
repurchase transactions with the central
bank.  This facility was chosen in order to
solidify the central bank’s legal claim to the
securities involved, rather than for any
substantive economic reason (Bank for
International Settlements, 1997a, p. 13).
Similarly, daylight credit for the RTGS
component of Japan’s BOJ-Net is available
exclusively through sale and repurchase
transactions.  Given adequate supplies of
collateral securities in the market, a central
bank intraday credit policy involving
unpriced but collateralized overdrafts 
(or sale and repurchase transactions) 
with no quantity limits or relatively high
ones could also be termed fairly liberal, 
as is the case in the United States on 
Fedwire. 
Finally, Switzerland alone among the
G-10 countries with RTGS systems operates
a very restrictive policy toward central
bank intraday credit.  The Swiss SIC system
does not allow daylight overdrafts on any
basis (collateralized or not), nor does the
Swiss National Bank (SNB) provide facili-
ties for intraday sale and repurchase
agreements.  The only direct liquidity
assistance provided by the SNB is collater-
alized overnight borrowing, which, if it
arises from a failure by a bank to produce
reserve funds to cover its queued payments,
incurs a penalty rate of interest (Bank for




As part of their overall function of 
providing bank-to-bank large-value funds
transfers, RTGS payments systems frequently
constitute one element in a delivery-versus-
payment (DVP) settlement system for
securities or of a payment-versus-payment
(PVP) system for settling foreign-exchange
trading obligations (Bank for International
Settlements, 1992, p. 15; Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 1993a, p. 4).  Many
new DVP and PVP systems are being
planned or discussed (Bank for International
Settlements, 1997a, pp. 33-7).  The three
main models for structuring DVP systems
are outlined below (Bank for International
Settlements, 1992, pp. 17-24):  
Model 1 DVP Systems. So-called
“Model 1” DVP systems consist of linked
gross, simultaneous settlement of a securi-
ties transfer (delivery) and the correspond-
ing funds transfer (payment).  The Federal
Reserve’s Securities Transfer Service for
U.S. Treasury and agency securities (com-
monly called the “Fedwire book-entry sys-
tem”) operates on the same principle as
RTGS systems for funds transfers.  That is,
the seller of a security (comparable to the
payor of funds above) must post the secu-
rities with the system operator before the
buyer of the security (comparable to the
funds payee above) takes ﬁnal, irrevocable
7 Richards reports that a much
larger group of banks–about
700–appear to keep their
overdrafts within their net debit
caps by managing intraday liq-
uidity, thereby avoiding over-
draft fees, as well (Richards,
1995, p. 1072).
8 To be fully effective as a central
bank risk-management tool in 
a real-time payments system, 
a full-collateralization policy
requires a “Model 1” DVP sys-
tem covering collateral-eligible
securities.  The point is that 
collateral securities must be
available for real-time pledges,
as well.
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29delivery.  The Fed’s book-entry and funds
transfer services are linked and together
constitute a “Model 1” DVP system (Bank
for International Settlements, 1992, 
pp. A322-24).
A few other central banks have devel-
oped already or are in the process of
developing similar systems.  In particular,
“Model 1” DVP systems will be critical in
providing the future European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) with the protection
against individual banks’ credit risk
envisioned in the policy of collateralized
intraday overdrafts.  Although the ESCB
has no plans to establish a Europe-wide
gross settlement system for securities, indi-
vidual national securities settlement
systems will be linked with TARGET to
establish “Model 1” DVP systems.
Model 2 DVP Systems.  A “Model 2”
DVP system consists of gross settlements
of securities transfers, followed at the end
of the day by net settlement of funds trans-
fers.  The U.K. gilt-edged (Treasury) secu-
rities market operated according to this
model as of 1992 (Bank for International
Settlements, 1992, pp. A319-21).  In this
type of system, all securities transfers are
ﬁnal when executed during the day.
However, the corresponding funds trans-
fers remain provisional until the end of the
day, when ﬁnal settlement occurs on a
multilateral net basis.  Failure of a bank in
a net-debit position on funds transfers (i.e.,
owing funds after calculation of net funds
positions) does not affect the ﬁnality of
securities transfers that have already 
taken place.
Model 3 DVP Systems.  Finally, “Model
3” DVP systems consist of parallel multilat-
eral net settlement of securities and funds
transfers.  The Bank of Japan’s “DVP-NET”
is an example of this type of system (Bank
for International Settlements, 1992, 
pp. A37-9).  Private DVP systems that fol-
low this model include the Government
Securities Clearing Corporation, the
National Securities Clearing Corporation,
the Depository Trust Company, and the
Participants Trust Company in the United
States, and Euroclear and Cedel Bank in
Europe (Federal Reserve System, 1997).
As noted above, ﬁnal settlement of the net
obligations on one or both legs (securities
and/or funds) that arise in these systems is
typically accomplished via a gross settle-
ment system. This points out an important
complementarity that often exists between
the various types of DVP systems.  “Model
3” DVP systems in the U.S. may use the
Federal Reserve’s “Model 1” DVP system to
provide ﬁnal settlement of the net obliga-
tions of participants resulting from multi-
lateral clearing of securities or funds
transfers.
PVP Systems.  PVP systems are analogous
to “Model 1” DVP systems because they
allow a pair of ﬁnancial transfers to be set-
tled on a gross basis simultaneously and
with ﬁnality.  The difference is that each
leg of a PVP transaction consists of a funds
transfer on a different national RTGS
funds-transfer system.  That is, instead of
providing simultaneous transfers of securi-
ties and funds in a single currency, PVP
systems allow foreign-exchange transac-
tions to be settled with ﬁnality in real time.
PVP systems could be helpful in reducing 
foreign-exchange settlement risk, the 
single largest remaining source of risk 
in G-10 payments and settlement systems
(Bank for International Settlements, 
1996, pp. 4-5).  
No PVP systems linking national
RTGS systems are currently operating or
being planned.  Although it may appear to
be such a system, the TARGET system in
Europe will link national RTGS systems
operating in the same currency, the euro.
Therefore, TARGET’s interlinking of
national RTGS systems will constitute a
communications and clearing system only
(similar to the ﬁnancial links between 
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the
United States).
Private foreign-exchange netting
arrangements provide PVP elements
without central-bank involvement in a
manner analogous to a “Model 3” DVP
system.  For example, in a multilateral for-
eign-exchange netting arrangement that
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each of the ten banks would be informed
at the end of the day of its net position
(debit or credit), in each of the four
currencies, vis-a-vis the other members.
Settlement of each bank’s obligation in
each currency would then proceed in sepa-
rate national large-value payments systems
(such as CHIPS or Fedwire in the United
States) and therefore would not be linked
or simultaneous.
A multilateral foreign-exchange
netting agreement that nets currency-by-
currency reduces overall settlement risk by
lowering the amount of each currency
owed to or by any given bank.  That is, all
of a bank’s trades involving U.S. dollars
covered by the agreement are reduced to 
a smaller net U.S. dollar amount due or
receivable, all of the bank’s trades involving
deutsche marks are netted to a smaller net
deutsche mark amount due or receivable,
etc.  As in the “Model 3” DVP systems for
securities settlement, one could think of
this foreign-exchange netting approach as
parallel provisional settlement rather than
linked ﬁnal settlement (“Model 1”).  Final
settlement of the net positions in each cur-
rency must still be carried out separately.
Both multilateral and bilateral foreign-
exchange netting arrangements currently
exist in the United States and Europe.  
The Multinet International Bank and
ECHO (Exchange Clearing House) are
multilateral foreign-exchange netting 
services, while FXNET, S.W.I.F .T. (Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication), and VALUNET 
provide bilateral netting services for banks
engaged in foreign-exchange trading 
(Bank for International Settlements, 
1996, p. 15-16).
A newly formed venture, CLS Services,
Ltd., is an important private-sector initia-
tive that will attempt to implement a PVP
system that is analogous in some respects
to a “Model 1” DVP system but is closer to
traditional correspondent banking in other
respects.  CLS Services, Ltd., which is
jointly owned by a group of banks active
in foreign-exchange trading, plans to create
a subsidiary bank to function as a multi-
currency ﬁnancial institution that can 
perform simultaneous, matched, “on-us”
transfers of various currencies.  Formed 
by the so-called G-20 group of major inter-
national banks, this “continuous linked
settlement” bank (hence CLS Services)
would eliminate the time delay between
settlement of the two legs of a foreign-
exchange transaction, which is the source
of the most serious risk exposures in this
market (Bank for International Settlements,
1996, p. 22; “Global Banks,” 1997).  In
addition to being available for direct use
by individual trading banks, the CLS bank
could also assist netting arrangements
such as FXNET and Multinet in discharging
the net obligations that remained among
participants after netting in individual cur-
rencies had occurred.
As in a “Model 1” PVP system, the
CLS bank could provide virtually instanta-
neous conﬁrmations to trading banks in
each currency on a gross basis.  Settlement
would be ﬁnal, although withdrawals of
individual currencies might be delayed by
the failure of counterparty banks to fund
their CLS accounts with the appropriate
mix of currencies.  Thus, the CLS bank
could not provide unconditional protection
against foreign-exchange liquidity risk—
as with a true “Model 1” PVP system—
because some trades that are settled may
not allow counterparties to withdraw spe-
ciﬁc currencies immediately (Bank for
International Settlements, 1996, p. 22).
For example, suppose a Japanese 
bank and an American bank use the CLS
bank for a single foreign exchange trade
during one day.  The Japanese bank
promises to send an American bank yen,
and the American bank promises to pay
dollars to the Japanese bank.  If a sufﬁcient
amount of yen is not in its CLS account 
by the end of the day, the Japanese bank
must fund that account with an RTGS
transfer to the CLS bank over BOJ-Net.  
If the Japanese bank is declared insolvent
before funding its yen account, the CLS
bank might cancel this trade.9 In any 
case, if the American bank has been
counting on the trade for fulﬁlling other
time-critical obligations, the failure of 
9 This would occur if the CLS
bank operated according to the
“guaranteed refund system”
(Bank for International
Settlements, 1996, p. 22).
Alternatively, if the CLS bank
operated under the “guaran-
teed receipt system,” a mem-
ber bank could receive yen if
and only if it delivered dollars
to the CLS bank.  The latter sys-
tem would involve a perfor-
mance guarantee from the CLS
bank requiring capital or loss-
sharing commitments by owner
banks.  At present, it appears
likely that the CLS bank will
take the latter approach. 
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or delay. 
Hence, although the CLS bank could
eliminate the settlement and liquidity risks
inherent in a large number of foreign-
exchange trades, it would not be operating
as a true “Model 1”  PVP system.  Instead,
the CLS bank would be acting as a corre-
spondent bank for each of its account
holders.  Thus, it could not uncondition-
ally guarantee that all foreign-exchange
trades would be perfectly liquid.  Only 
central banks with the ability to create
unlimited amounts of their own currency
can jointly operate a “Model 1” PVP system.
NET SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
The principal alternatives to RTGS 
systems for large-value funds transfers 
are bilateral correspondent-banking
relationships and multilateral deferred net
settlement (DNS) systems.10 Both
correspondent banking and multilateral
netting systems offset gross payments
obligations in order to arrive at a much
smaller net settlement obligation.11
Similarly, the principal alternative to trade-
by-trade gross settlement of trades in
securities and other ﬁnancial obligations 
is a net securities or ﬁnancial obligation
settlement system.
The primary beneﬁt to ﬁnancial insti-
tutions of netting is a reduced need for
immediate liquidity or ownership of secu-
rities, since ﬁnal settlement is deferred
until the end of the clearing cycle (usually
the end of the business day).  Because
deferral of settlement implicitly requires a
ﬁnancial institution to extend credit to
another institution from which it expects
to receive funds or securities, longer elapsed
periods between settlements also imply
greater exposure of individual payee banks
to the credit risks posed by their payments
counterparties, the payors (Shen, 1997,
pp. 48-50).  Thus, it is clear that both the
primary beneﬁts and the principal costs of
netting derive from the use of private
credit in settlement activity (see shaded
insert: “Private Credit Extensions in Net
Settlement Systems”).
In addition to creating risky private
intraday credit, however, netting arrange-
ments also reduce the absolute amount of
settlement activity that must ultimately
occur.  In general, the longer the period
between successive settlements, the greater
the reduction in settlement obligations.
Consequently, the direct credit exposures
that build up over an extended clearing
cycle in a netting system are, at the same
time, reduced by the process of netting
(Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1988, p. 4).  The greater is
the amount of two-way trading among a
set of counterparties during a clearing
cycle (i.e., buying and selling of the same
ﬁnancial instrument), the more likely it is
that the risk-reducing aspect of netting
will outweigh the risk-increasing nature of
deferred settlement.  Thus, when bilateral
and multilateral netting arrangements are
soundly structured in appropriate circum-
stances, regulators generally welcome
them.  This conclusion is particularly true
today after the decade-long efforts by the
Committee on Payments and Settlement
Systems of the Bank for International Set-
tlements, and by individual central banks,
to upgrade the soundness of existing and
proposed multilateral net settlement
systems in the G-10 countries.
Deferred Net Settlement (DNS)
Large-Value Funds Transfer Systems
Table 3 lists the major DNS large-value
funds transfer systems in the G-10 countries.
The largest private DNS payments system in
the world is the Clearing House Interbank
Payments System (CHIPS) in the United
States (see Tables 4 and 5).  CHIPS is 
operated by the New York Clearing House
Association and includes over 100 domestic
and foreign banks as its members.  Fedwire,
by way of contrast, connects roughly
10,000 ﬁnancial institutions in the United
States to the Federal Reserve and thereby
to each other.
Private-sector large-value payments
clearing houses like CHIPS are not a
prominent feature of the Japanese or most
European payments systems, for largely
10 It is important to note that RTGS
and DNS systems are not direct
competitors in all respects.
DNS systems typically rely on
the national RTGS system for
ﬁnal daily settlement of the
multilateral net (or “Net Net”)
obligations incurred by partici-
pants in the netting system.
11 In correspondent banking, one
bank holds deposit balances at
another (or they hold balances
with each other) that can be
debited or credited for funds
transfers, foreign exchange,
securities, derivatives, or other
transactions.  Accumulated net
credits or debits may be settled
periodically through transfers of
central bank reserves.  These
relationships are very important
in foreign-exchange trading
because they form the only link
between different national
RTGS or DNS systems. For an
overview of payments and set-
tlement in the foreign exchange
market, see Gilbert (1992).
For detailed discussions of mar-
ket practices and risks in the
foreign-exchange market, 
see Bank for International
Settlements  (1989, 1990,
1993a, 1996).
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tions, however.  The United Kingdom’s
Clearing House Automated Payment System
(CHAPS) settled large-value funds transfers
in pounds sterling on a multilateral net
basis between 1984 and 1996.  Subse-
quently, the system became a real-time
gross settlement interface between private
banks and the Bank of England (European
Monetary Institute, 1996, p. 627).
Another private DNS payments system
in Europe is the ECU Clearing and
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PRIVATE CREDIT EXTENSIONS IN  
NET SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
Deferring ﬁnal settlement requires an implicit extension of credit from payee 
to payor in net settlement systems.  Intraday loans are economically important even
though there is no explicit private intraday credit market in most countries.  That is,
the time value of an intraday loan may be zero (more precisely, no market price exists),
but net settlement systems require them in order to function, and lenders in such 
systems bear the sometimes substantial credit risks imposed by borrowers.
Consider an example in which three banks, called Banks A, B, and C, are the mem-
bers of a DNS system.  They enter payment orders at different times during the busi-
ness day, which extends from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (the time of each payment request
is listed in parentheses in the table below).  Final settlement occurs at 5:00 on a multi-
lateral net basis.  All three banks know the amount and timing of upcoming payment
ﬂows at the beginning of the business day:
Receiving Bank (Lender)
Paying Bank (Borrower) Bank A Bank B Bank C
Bank A $100 (9:05 a.m.)
Bank B $100 (4:59 p.m.)
Bank C $100 (9:10 a.m.)
Final settlement occurs at 5:00 p.m., so Bank B is effectively lending Bank A $100
during the period from 9:05 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  Typically there is no explicit cost for this
intraday credit, although collateral requirements may impose some opportunity cost on
the payor.  Similarly, Bank C receives an intraday loan of $100 from Bank A between
9:10 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., while Bank B receives an intraday loan of $100 from Bank C
between 4:59 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.  Viewed at the end of the day, all banks are in an iden-
tical position with zero net debits or credits vis-à-vis the system.  In other words, no
actual payments are required to settle the day’s transactions if the netting agreement has
legal standing (see the section on the legal status of netting agreements below) or if all
banks are solvent at the end of the day.
This end-of-day symmetry masks the fact that Bank B was a net lender to Bank C
for most of the business day, whereas it received a promise for $100 from Bank A early
in the day.  If Bank B had not entered its payment order to Bank C before 5:00 p.m., 
and had Bank C been unable to settle its resulting net debit of $100, Bank B would be
forced to recover its $100 claim against the netting system.  Bank C would have a net
debit position in the system of $100, so Bank B would have a claim against Bank C and
any other resources already committed to support the netting system, such as collateral,
capital, or back-up lines of credit underwritten by surviving members.  Thus, relatively
modest end-of-day net settlement amounts in a multilateral netting system (zero in this
example) may disguise substantial intraday credit exposures faced by individual banks.Settlement System operated by the ECU
Banking  Association (EBA) since 1983
(European Monetary Institute, 1996, 
pp. 692-96).  After clearing interbank pay-
ment obligations denominated in ECU
(the European Currency Unit, a ﬁxed
basket of European currencies) on a multi-
lateral net basis, ﬁnal settlement takes
place in accounts at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) in Basle,
Switzerland.  The BIS acts as a correspon-
dent bank for all the clearing banks in 
the arrangement, who agree to maintain
clearing accounts without overdraft
features. The private ECU clearing system
does not currently meet the Lamfalussy
minimum standards for netting schemes.12
However, reforms including sender caps,
liquidity-sharing, and loss-sharing
agreements are being implemented to
increase the safety of settlement procedures
(European Monetary Institute, 1996, 
p. 695).  The EBA plans to convert the
ECU clearing system to one that will settle
interbank euro payments on a multilateral
net basis beginning in 1999, or whenever
the single currency is introduced.  The
new system will be called EURO 1 and is
expected to play a role in Europe analogous
to that of CHIPS in the United States,
providing large-value multilateral net settle-
ment  services alongside TARGET, the
RTGS system for euro. 
Finally, the major banking groups in
many European countries (for example,
private commercial banks, state-owned
savings banks, or co-operative banks)
either clear interbank payments through
the national central bank or operate 
their own centralized correspondent 
(or bankers’ banks) that provide clearing
and other services to the sector’s members
(see Bank for International Settlements,
1993b, pp. 166-78, for a discussion of 
the German case).  These private-sector
arrangements handle primarily small-value
transactions, however.
In Japan, the Foreign Exchange Yen
Clearing System (FEYCS) was established
in 1980 by the Tokyo Bankers Association
(TBA) to handle yen settlement of cross-
border transactions, comparable to the role
of CHIPS in the United States.  However,
the TBA transferred the operation of FEYCS
12 The Lamfalussy standards specify
the minimum criteria any pri-
vate net settlement system
must meet to be acceptable to
a G-10 central bank (Bank for
International Settlement,
1990).  See the discussion and
Table 6 for an overview of
these standards.
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Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) Systems in G-10 Countries
Country  Name of DNS System  Year of Implementation
Belgium  CH (Clearing House of Belgium)  NA
Canada  LVTS (Large Value Transfer System)  1998
France  SNP (Syste`me Net Protégé)  1997
Germany  EAF2 (Elektronische Abwicklung Frankfurt)  1996
Italy  ME (Electronic memoranda); SIPS  1989, 1989
Japan  Zengin (Zengin Data Telecommunications System); 
FEYCS (Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System); BOJ-Net  1973, 1989, 1988
Netherlands  8007-SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Transfers); FA  1982, 1985
Sweden  —  —
Switzerland  —  —
United Kingdom  CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System)  1984
United States  CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System)  1970
Cross-border  ECU Clearing System  1983
SOURCES:  Bank for International Settlements (1997a), p. 4 and Annex 2; Bank for International Settlements (1995b), Table 10a; Bank
for International Settlements (1993b), pp. 305-06; pp. 498-501.
Table 3to the Bank of Japan in 1989 (Bank for
International Settlements, 1993b, 
pp. 261-68).
Monitoring and Risk Management
in Deferred Net Settlement Systems
The BIS and individual central banks
have strongly encouraged the members of
many DNS systems to intensify their risk-
management efforts in recent years, hence
increasing the private-sector costs of using
them.  In Europe, the central banks of the
(then) European Economic Community
set down recommendations regarding the
minimum common features of domestic
payments systems in 1993 (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 1997a, p. 40).  In the
United States, the Federal Reserve updated
its payments-system risk policy for the
design and operation of privately operated
large-value multilateral netting schemes in
1994 and again in 1997 (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 1997a, p. 40; McConnell,
1997, p. 2).
Many G-10 central banks now distin-
guish between “secured” DNS systems  —
essentially, those that meet the Lamfalussy
standards  —  and all other DNS systems 
(see Table 6).  A secured DNS system is
one that is capable of settling all net oblig-
ations at the end of a clearing cycle, even
when the member with the largest net-debit
position is unable to settle (Standard 4).
Banks may establish a “failsafe” settlement
guarantee by posting collateral in advance,
lodging capital funds at the clearing house,
forming a joint back-up settlement agree-
ment with the members, obtaining a
government guarantee, or some combination
of these elements (Bank for International
Settlements, 1997a, pp. 39-42).
In principle, direct monitoring by banks
of other banks is a potentially signiﬁcant
beneﬁt associated with private multilateral
net settlement systems.  This is because
private ﬁnancial institutions may obtain
ﬁner levels of detail, in a more timely
fashion, about other market participants
than is possible for central banks or other
banking supervisors.  The ﬁnancial expo-
sure one bank creates for another in such a
system provides a strong incentive for the
creditor bank to monitor the debtor bank.
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Milestones in the Development of CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank
Payments System)
Event  Date
Computerization of message transfers for participants  April 1970
Paper Exchange Payment System (PEPS) implemented for non-members  March 1972
Larger computer installed; all PEPS-using banks become CHIPS participants  October 1974
Same-day settlement implemented through special reserve account at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York  October 1981
Bilateral credit mechanism implemented  October 1984
Sender net debit caps installed  March 1986
Loss-sharing arrangement among all participants implemented; collateral 
requirements to support each participant’s contingent liability  October 1990
New criteria for settling participants adopted  March 1992
New message format adopted August 1992
Settlement-ﬁnality improvements announced, including reduced net debit caps, 
increased collateral requirements, and modiﬁed loss-sharing procedures  July 1995
SOURCES:  Hook (1994); Richards (1995).
Table 4Reliance on direct bilateral monitoring
by banks in multilateral payments and set-
tlement systems is subject to at least two
shortcomings, however.  Most importantly,
decentralized monitoring in multilateral
DNS systems suffers from a fundamental
“free-rider problem.”  Each participating
bank realizes that any losses created by a
member in excess of its own resources 
will be shared among all the remaining
members  in some fashion.  Any individual
bank’s ﬁnancial exposure to a counterparty
in the system is therefore attenuated by 
the co-insurance feature of the multilateral
system; consequently, that bank’s incentive
to monitor is reduced. Some elements 
of shared ﬁnancial responsibility remain
even in systems that attempt to allocate
residual risks to members in proportion 
to their dealings with the defaulting 
participant.  Therefore, diffused ﬁnancial
risks in a multilateral payments and 
settlement system necessarily imply a
reduced intensity and quality of
monitoring relative to purely bilat-
eral relationships. 
An additional shortcoming is that 
the monitoring efﬁciency of a net settlement
system is likely to be sensitive to the size
of the membership.  Increasing the number
of participating banks increases the moni-
toring burden on each bank, a situation
that may lead to a decreased quality of
monitoring.  This problem exists indepen-
dently of the free-rider problem identiﬁed
above; in fact, it becomes more acute the
less the system shares risk among all partic-
ipants.  To see this, consider a multilateral
DNS system that provides no risk sharing
at all among its surviving members and
which “unwinds” (cancels) all transactions
involving a defaulting bank.  Each member
is fully exposed to the losses created by
each of its transactions with a failed coun-
terparty, so it must monitor all of them as
if no multilateral system existed at all.  If
the increased monitoring burden results in
a lower quality of monitoring, the end result
is a greater risk of unanticipated disruption
(Bank for International Settlements, 1997a,
pp. 39-43).  Restricting the membership 
of any payments or settlement system to
encourage better monitoring incentives is
likely to run afoul of antitrust regulations,
however.  This conﬂict between restricting
access in order to preserve monitoring
incentives and the need to remain open 
to new members to promote competition
is likely to become more serious as ﬁnan-
cial markets become more global and
interconnected.
Centralized monitoring (i.e., delegation
of monitoring responsibilities to a central
authority, such as a clearing house) may be
a viable option in some cases, but central-
ization entails difﬁcult issues in its own
right.  These include the need to “monitor
the monitor” and to decide on a formula
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Participants, Number, and Value of Transfers on CHIPS
Year-End Number Annual Number Annual Dollar Value 
Year  of Participants  of Transfers (millions)  of Transfers (trillions)
1971  15  0.8  1
1975  63  6.0  11
1980  100  13.2  37
1985  142  24.9  78
1990  131  37.3  222
1991  126  37.6  217
1992  122  39.1  238
1993  121  42.2  266
1994  115  45.6  295
1995  111  51.0  310
1996  104  53.4  332
SOURCE:  CHIPS (1997).
Table 5for allocating any losses that cannot be
covered by the pool of resources (collateral
or equity capital) held at the central insti-
tution.  The centralized monitor must also
guard against exposing members to moral
hazard:  When freed from the direct scrutiny
of other members, they might be more
tempted to act in ways that would increase
the system’s overall risk.  In sum, private-
sector risk management in net settlement
systems is promising but problematic.
Participating banks possess some natural
advantages over regulators in providing
monitoring services, but private monitoring
is likely to be costly and imperfect, regard-
less of how it is done.
Financial-Obligation 
Netting Systems
Table 7 lists some important netting
systems and agreements for securities,
derivatives, and foreign exchange.  These
arrangements are collectively known as
ﬁnancial-obligation netting arrangements
(in contrast to payments netting arrange-
ments).  The basic mechanics of netting
are similar for multilateral payments and
obligation netting systems.  In particular,
each member of the netting arrangement
enters trades with counterparties, which
are recorded in real time.  It then settles its
ﬁnal obligation to the system—either a net
credit or a net debit—only at the end of
the clearing cycle.  Settlement occurs either
several times during the day or once at the
end of the day.
In addition to providing periodic net
settlement of ﬁnancial obligations, organized
derivatives exchanges also require ﬁrms to
post and maintain margins.  That is, mem-
bers must make available to the clearing
house cash or other liquid assets sufﬁcient
to cover likely changes in the net value of
the ﬁrm’s positions implied by movements
in ﬁnancial markets (Bank for International
Settlements, 1997b, pp. 21-4).  Margin
management is an important risk-control
tool of derivatives exchanges that requires
efﬁcient banking operations (so-called
“money settlement”) to function effectively.
In this sense, ﬁnancial-obligation netting
systems can be compared to DVP systems
for securities settlement.
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The Lamfalussy Standards
Area of Concern Proposed Standard
Table 6
1. Legal basis of netting schemes
2. Participants’ understanding 
of ﬁnancial risks





Netting schemes should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.
Netting scheme participants should have a clear understanding of the impact of the par-
ticular scheme on each of the ﬁnancial risks affected by the netting process.
Multilateral netting systems should have clearly deﬁned procedures for the management
of credit risks and liquidity risks that specify the respective responsibilities of the netting
provider and the participants.  These procedures should also ensure that all parties have
both the incentives and the capabilities to manage and contain each of the risks they
bear and that limits are placed on the maximum level of credit exposure that can be 
produced by each participant.
Multilateral netting systems should, at a minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely
completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant
with the largest single net-debit position.
Multilateral netting systems should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for
admission that permit fair and open access.
All netting schemes should ensure the operational reliability of technical systems and the
availability of back-up facilities capable of completing daily processing requirements.
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements (1990, p. 5).Organized derivatives exchanges use
two primary models for carrying out trading
activities and settling margins: the central
bank model and the private settlement
bank model (Bank for International Settle-
ments, 1997b, pp. 12-15).  In the central
bank model, the derivatives exchange
and/or its members hold reserve accounts
directly at the central bank; these accounts
can be debited and credited in real time 
to effect cash transfers in support of trading
and margining activities.  Most continental
European G-10 derivatives exchanges
follow this model (Bank for International
Settlements, 1997b, Annex 2).  This
money-settlement model for derivatives
exchanges is similar to the “Model 2” DVP
securities settlement system noted above
(gross securities settlement followed by
deferred net settlement of payments),
except that the roles of the two ﬁnancial
instruments are reversed.  That is, in the
central bank model of money settlement
for derivatives exchanges, the traded ﬁnan-
cial obligations are settled on a deferred
net basis, while cash payments—including
margins—are carried out in the national
RTGS system.  Of course, cash payments
to effect margin and open-position adjust-
ments are not carried out in real time on
any derivatives exchange; the point is that
the central bank model of money settlement
can provide continuous marking-to-market
in the cash account. 
The second type of money-settlement
model for derivatives exchanges involves
private settlement banks.  This approach—
which is used in the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Japan (Bank for International Settlements,
1997b, Annex 2)—is comparable to a
“Model 3” DVP system in which both
ﬁnancial obligations and funds transfers
are settled on a net basis some time after
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Private-Sector Financial-Obligation Netting Arrangements
Netting System or Agreement Organizers Descriptio n
Table 7
SOURCES:  Richards (1995, p. 1075); Labrecque (1996, p. 21); Foreign Exchange Committee (1995); Federal Reserve System (1997).
Futures and options exchanges (Chicago
Board of Trade, Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
Chicago Board Options Exchange, London
International Financial Futures Exchange,
Deutsche Terminboerse, Marché a ` Terme
International de France, etc.)
Government Securities Clearing 
Corporation (GSCC)
National Securities Clearing 
Corporation (NSCC)
Model Interbank Foreign Exchange 
Netting Agreement (IFEMA)
International Securities Dealers Association
(ISDA) obligation-netting agreements 










Clearing Corporations are central counter-
parties for all transactions with end-of-day
mark-to-market and daily settlement
through a single settlement account across
all exchange-traded contracts.
Government securities clearing agency
offering automated trade comparison, net-
ting, and risk-management services
Clearing agency for U.S. equities, long- and
medium-term corporate and municipal
bonds, guarantees settlement
Master agreement for bilateral close-out
netting, netting by novation, or payment
netting of foreign-exchange obligations in
an over-the-counter (off-exchange) setting
Framework agreements for implementing
obligation netting in an over-the-counter
setting
Master agreement for bilateral close-out
netting of over-the-counter optionsthe trades (or margin calls) are issued.
Continuous marking-to-market in central
bank funds is not feasible in this model
unless private settlement banks are prepared
to give derivatives exchange members
essentially direct access to RTGS systems
via deposit accounts.  This approach
would approximate the indirect access to
Fedwire that non-bank securities dealers
obtain in the United States via their
clearing banks.  
Systemic Risk in Gross and Net
Settlement Systems
If settlement lag is the “building block”
of risk in the DNS systems, then systemic
risk represents the collapse of the ediﬁce.
Systemic risk in its narrowest sense refers to
the possibility of a chain reaction of settle-
ment failures in an interlinked payments or
settlement system.  In more general terms,
systemic risk encompasses situations in
which the credit or liquidity problems for
one or more market participants create 
substantial credit or liquidity problems 
for participants elsewhere in the ﬁnancial
system (Berger, Hancock, and Marquardt,
1996, p. 706).  It is largely the specter 
of systemic risk that has preoccupied
payments-systems experts at G-10 central
banks for the last decade or so, generating
the veritable cascade of BIS reports
mentioned earlier.  The most noteworthy 
of these reports may have been the
Lamfalussy Report of 1990.  Under these
standards, so-called secured DNS systems
are characterized by speciﬁc risk-
management provisions their members
must have implemented to reduce 
systemic risk (Table 6).
Gross settlement systems seek to elim-
inate systemic risk by inserting “circuit
breakers” into payments and settlement
chains.  The key is that an institution
attempting to make a  payment or effect a
settlement over a gross settlement system
is required to post “cash in advance” (or
collateral or securities, depending on the
type of payments or settlement system).13
Gross settlement systems do not allow the
insolvency of one ﬁnancial institution to
be transmitted to others through the pay-
ments system, because settlements are
never conditional on a paying institution’s
solvency.14
By way of contrast, DNS systems
merely accumulate records of “IOUs”—
that is, credit extensions—issued by banks
to each other during the business day.
These IOUs are netted against each other
and settled in cash or by delivery of the
relevant securities or foreign currency at
the end of the clearing cycle—as long as
none of the participants in a net debit posi-
tion defaults.  In case of such a default, the
entire set of transactions may be unwound
and re-entered after all of the defaulting
institution’s transactions have been deleted.
Another factor that makes settlement
lag a source of risk is that a party due to
receive a payment may prematurely consider
the payment ﬁnal.  Since the payee may
receive some information about the pending
payment during the settlement lag, either
from the payor directly or from the DNS
system, there may be a temptation, or
indeed an established local business prac-
tice, to take the payment for granted.
Clearly, decoupling the payment informa-
tion from the ﬁnal settlement increases
DNS ﬂexibility and the ﬂexibility of ﬁnan-
cial institutions that use it, but it also
creates the potential for complex scenarios
of disruption.15
Legal Status of Netting
Arrangements
As noted, the ultimate source of risk 
in DNS systems is settlement lag, the time
that elapses between the inital transmission
of a payment request from the sending
bank to the DNS system and the ﬁnal
receipt of good funds or securities by the
receiving bank (Bank for International Set-
tlements, 1997a, pp. 7-9; Shen, 1997, 
pp. 48-53).  In addition, legal uncertainty
surrounding netting agreements in many
jurisdictions makes the risk of settlement
failure costly.  Rather than being exposed
to the smaller risk that a valid netting
agreement implies, some banks could lose
the larger gross amount due from a coun-
13 Fedwire allows payors to over-
draw their reserve accounts
without posting speciﬁc collater-
al; for this reason, some have
compared it to a DNS system
(Kahn and Roberds, 1996, 
p. 3).  From the payee’s (and
the systemic-risk) perspective,
however, Fedwire functions as
an RTGS system, since every
payment is ﬁnal when received.
14 Unfortunately, in a gross settle-
ment system a distressed ﬁnan-
cial institution’s illiquidity can
be transmitted to other partici-
pants, resulting in a systemic
liquidity crisis or gridlock.
15 Some RTGS systems are also
vulnerable to this problem, as
noted above.  In particular,
those that place outgoing but
unexecuted payment orders in
a queue and allow receiving
banks to “look into the queue”
may encourage banks to antici-
pate payments before they
become ﬁnal.
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stand up under legal challenge.
The legal status of interbank netting
agreements in the United States results
from four different bodies of insolvency
law:  (1) the U.S. bankruptcy code as
amended in 1990, (2) the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA), (3) New York State
banking legislation (including Article 4A
of the Uniform Commercial Code applying
to wholesale electronic funds transfers,
drafted in 1989), and (4) the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA).16
In general in the United States, netting
or set-off arrangements are stayed (i.e., not
allowed to proceed) in bankruptcy because
netting imposes a de facto seniority struc-
ture where none exists de jure (Rochet and
Tirole, 1996, p. 837).  Similarly, secured
creditors are prevented from repossessing
their security after a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing (Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995, p. 275).
From this perspective, netting is inconsis-
tent with the overall intent of formal
bankruptcy proceedings, which is to
satisfy all creditor demands in an orderly
and equitable manner according to strict
priority rules.  However, certain ﬁnancial
contracts are exempted from this general
disallowance of netting in bankruptcy
because Congress and many state
legislatures have accepted the argument
that some netting arrangements should be
allowed to proceed to avoid triggering sys-
temic failures in the ﬁnancial system.
The bankruptcy code, FIRREA, and
New York State banking legislation
(including Article 4A) are similar with
respect to netting agreements, including
“safe harbors” for swap agreements, secu-
rities contracts, commodities contracts,
forward contracts, and repurchase
agreements (Russo, 1996, p. 98).  In addi-
tion, Article 4A and the Federal Reserve’s
Regulation J (governing large-value
electronic funds transfers, including Fed-
Wire) explicitly permit net settlement of
wholesale electronic funds transfers among
banks in order to encourage banks to
accept payment orders from ﬁnancially
weak sending banks (Patrikis, Bhala, and
Fois, 1994, pp. 36-7).
In contrast to the previous case-by-
case legal approach to netting, the FDICIA
of 1991 essentially permits all netting
agreements among ﬁnancial institutions
(including clearing houses) to proceed
notwithstanding bankruptcy or insolvency.
In other words, netting agreements now
have a ﬁrm legal foundation in U.S. law
with the implication that the de facto
seniority created by a netting agreement
among ﬁnancial institutions has become 
de jure and enforceable in transactions 
for which U.S. law prevails.
In general, the legal status of netting
agreements in countries outside the 
United States is uncertain (Bergsten, 1994,
pp. 451-52; Padoa-Schioppa, 1994, 
pp. 30-5; Bureau of National Affairs, 1997,
pp. 721-22).   The United Nations
Commission on International Trade
(UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Credit Trans-
fers in May 1992, which could have given
an impetus to international efforts to
solidify the legal standing of netting.  The
model law was developed under the inﬂu-
ence of the drafters of Article 4A of the
U.S. Uniform Commercial Code, which
gives explicit legal standing to netting of
wholesale electronic funds transfers.  In
the end, however, the UNCITRAL model
law did not include any provisions on the
applicability of netting agreements.  Con-
sequently, there are still gaps in most
countries’ insolvency laws concerning 
the enforceability of netting agreements
(Bergsten, 1994, p. 452).
In Switzerland, provisional payment
orders issued by a bank that is subsequently
declared bankrupt are deemed revoked
(the “zero-hour rule”)—that is, any
netting agreement including such a bank
must be unwound.  This rule makes
netting agreements unreliable for the par-
ticipants (Hess, 1994, p. 334).  Zero-hour
rules exist in other countries, as well.
In Japan, settlement of net positions 
in FEYCS, the Foreign Exchange Yen
Clearing System, is not explicitly insured
by the Bank of Japan.  A loss-sharing
16 This section follows discussions
in Russo (1996, pp. 97-100),
Cohen and Wiseman (1994,
pp. 53-9), and Patrikis, Bhala,
and Fois (1994, pp. 36-7).
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40arrangement is in place, but beyond this,
there is uncertainty about the implications
for participants of the default of a member
(Saito, 1994, pp. 223-24).  The Bank 
of Japan’s implicit guarantee of settlement
is widely assumed, however.
In the United Kingdom, ﬁnality of
payment is determined by common law.
In the absence of clear precedents in various
kinds of netting arrangements, the legal
status of the participants in any given
agreement is not entirely clear (Beaves,
1994, p. 364).
In France, the wholesale payments
netting system, SAGITTAIRE, is based 
on S.W.I.F.T. (Society for Worldwide Inter-
bank Financial Telecommunication)
messages, which are irrevocable from the
point of view of the sender once they have
been received.  However, the Banque de
France may revoke some exchanges.  The
net positions of members are drawn up
after the close of the accounting day, then
debited or credited on the books of the
Banque de France.  Transactions do not
become ﬁnal until 10:00 a.m. the following
day.  Hence, the legal status of participants
in SAGITTAIRE in the face of a default of 
a participant is unclear (Perdrix, 1994, 
pp. 148-49).  Recently, however, changes
have been made in the legal system to
assure the legal enforceability of bilateral
netting agreements (Padoa-Schioppa,
1994, p. 33).
In the European Union as a whole,
only four countries (Belgium, Germany,
France, and Italy) currently provide legal
assurance for the enforceability of bilateral
netting, while multilateral netting
agreements have no ﬁrm legal standing in
any E.U. country.17 Some progress toward
recognition of netting agreements for bank
supervisory purposes has been achieved
recently at the E.U. level.  In particular, the
so-called “EC Netting Directive” was issued
by the European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union in March 1996
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996, pp. 146-47).
This allows national bank supervisors to
adjust banks’ capital requirements downward
on the basis of close-out netting agreements
covering over-the-counter derivative
instruments if the concerned banks obtain
legal opinions stating that the agreements
are likely to be legally binding in all
relevant jurisdictions.  This is, of course,
far short of the solid legal basis for netting
agreements available in the United States
since 1991 and required by a strict inter-
pretation of the Lamfalussy Standards.
CONCLUSION
The wholesale payments and settlement
systems of G-10 countries have undergone
signiﬁcant change in recent years.  Recog-
nizing the inherent limitations and
vulnerability to disruption of bilateral and
multilateral netting arrangements for pay-
ments and settlement, private ﬁnancial
institutions and central banks alike have
implemented measures to make them safer.
Secured net settlement systems pose 
less threat of systemic disruption to G-10
payments and settlement systems than
unsecured systems.  Further progress in
establishing legal foundations for domestic
and cross-border netting arrangements 
will further solidify their contributions 
to the global ﬁnancial system.  The largest
costs associated with secured net
settlement systems today are those of 
day-to-day risk management incurred 
by participating banks.
A different approach to strengthening
the wholesale payments system is to create
and/or improve trade-by-trade (gross) set-
tlement systems for large-value funds
transfers and securities settlement.  Gross
settlement systems can be very effective in
reducing and isolating the sources of risk
that make netting systems vulnerable.
From the point of view of private-sector
participants, gross settlement systems 
virtually eliminate the need to manage
counterparty credit risk.  However, these
systems may impose signiﬁcant liquidity
costs on users, or they may require
substantial risk-management measures on
the part of central banks, depending on
the design of the system. 
There are several plausible hypotheses
for why the quantitative importance of gross
settlement systems remains limited at this
17 Table 1 in Padoa-Schioppa
(1994, p. 32) summarizes the
legal standing of various types
of netting arrangements in the
major European Union nations
as of 1994. 
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41point.  First, gross settlement systems have
become available in most G-10 countries
only recently.  It takes time for payments
and settlement practices to change, although
they probably will continue to do so over
the next few years, in large part because cen-
tral banks continue to encourage greater use
of gross settlement.
Second, existing net settlement systems
are well-established in most countries, and
they generally have a disruption-free track
record (even if they are or were unsecured).
Proponents of gross settlement systems
therefore have little actual evidence with
which to bolster their claims that net
settlement is excessively risky.
Finally, gross settlement systems may
have been adopted slowly because of their
signiﬁcant liquidity costs.  These costs
could be lessened if central banks paid a
market rate of interest on reserve balances
or pursued monetary policies that ensured
price stability and, hence, lower nominal
interest rates than would otherwise obtain.
Either approach might encourage ﬁnancial
institutions to hold larger clearing balances
(i.e., central bank reserves in excess of legal
minimums).  These balances could serve
as the basis for greater participation in
RTGS payments systems at little or no
opportunity cost.  They would also provide
ready collateral for intraday securities
lending to support gross settlement of
securities transactions.
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